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Abstract
How does international trade affect transitional dynamics of the relative wage for
unskilled workers when educational decisions and capital accumulation are consid-
ered? By including these channels in a dynamic quantitative trade model, I show that
reduced trade costs increase the skill premium and educational attainment in the steady
state. On the transitional path, capital accumulation and capital-skill complementarity
cause a more drastic increase in the skill premium in the earlier transition. In the long
run, education mitigates 65% of transitory trade-induced inequality on average. This
result explains the observed transitional paths of the skill premium in recent trade lib-
eralization episodes.
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1 Introduction
Studies on recent trade liberalization episodes inMexico, Korea, and China find that
trade liberalization results in a rapid increase in the skill premium in the early stage
of the transition, followed by a prolonged decline after the skill premium reaches
the peak.1 What forces drive this particular pattern during the transition?
Answering this question requires a dynamic framework to incorporate multiple
characteristics across countries and sectors. Some sectors are more skill intensive,
and some countries have more robust institutions or larger comparative advantages
in skill-intensive sectors. The sectoral and country-level differences are transmitted
via international trade, affecting the income inequality across countries.
I extend a multisector Eaton and Kortum (2002) model to a dynamic framework,
accommodating sectoral and country-level heterogeneity and geography. To em-
phasize the sectoral heterogeneity in the production technology, economic activity
is divided into agricultural and food production, machinery, high-skilled manufac-
turing, low-skilled manufacturing, low-skilled services and professional services.
The framework incorporates mechanisms such as capital-skill complementarity, as
in Parro (2013) and Krusell et al. (2000), capital accumulation and human capital
accumulation. Capital and human capital investment are chosen optimally in each
country. By quantifying this framework, the model is used to evaluate the contri-
bution of different mechanisms to the transitional dynamics of the skill premium
following unanticipated trade liberalization.
The model is parameterized to data from 2001 for 40 countries and 6 sectors us-
ing the World Input-Output Database. The educational institution for each country
is calibrated so that the steady-state skill premium implied by the model matches
1Robertson (2007), Campos-Va´zquez (2013) and Atolia and Kurokawa (2016) study the changes in
the college premium in Mexico after trade liberalization in the 1980s. Kim and Topel (2007) studies
the Korean labor market in the 1970s. Bai et al. (2019) investigate the income inequality in China
between 2000 and 2012.
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the observed skill premium for each country in the sample. I then conduct a coun-
terfactual in which there is an unanticipated, universal 25% reduction in bilateral
trade costs for all country pairs and all sectors, and the exact transitional paths are
computed for analysis.
The transitional dynamics of the skill premium implied by the counterfactual
exercise match the pattern observed in recent trade liberalization episodes. Follow-
ing unexpected trade liberalization, the skill premium of all countries in the sample
increases rapidly in the early stage of the transition and then exhibits a prolonged
and slow decline after reaching the peak. What are the mechanisms that drive this
particular pattern? Where do these mechanisms originate?
To understand the forces acting on different stages of the transition, various sce-
narios are considered by activating and deactivating capital and human capital ac-
cumulation. The exact transitional path for each scenario is also calculated. By
means of this decomposition exercise, the model indicates that trade liberalization
impacts the dynamics of skill premium via three channels, (i) comparative advan-
tage, (ii) capital accumulation, and (iii) education channels, which correspond to
short-, medium- and long-run effects. This framework explains the empirical obser-
vations of the response of the skill premium to recent trade liberalization episodes.
The model suggests that the drastic increase in the skill premium upon trade liber-
alization is driven by capital accumulation, and the following prolonged decline in
the skill premium is connected to the adjustment of education in the longer term.
These outcomes are closely related to the flexibility to adjust the factor supply at
different stages of the transition. In the short run, the economy is unable to adjust
the factor supply promptly upon trade liberalization; hence, the short-run effect is
driven mainly by comparative-advantage-induced reallocation of resources. In the
medium run, since capital adjusts faster than human capital, the effects of this stage
result from capital accumulation. Trade liberalization lowers the price of capital
goods; as a result, the economy starts to accumulate more capital. Through the
capital-skill complementarity, the relative productivity of skilled workers also rises,
2
thereby increasing the skill premium. In the long run, all factors adjust freely, and
the adjustment in human capital shifts the relative skill supply and neutralizes the
impacts of comparative advantage and capital accumulation.
Rising income inequality associated with globalization in many countries over
the past two decades has become a growing concern for policymakers around the
world (OECD. 2008 and Dabla-Norris et al. 2015). Education is often regarded as a
crucial instrument to combat inequality (see Corak 2013 andGregorio and Lee 2002);
therefore, quantifying the effectiveness of education in alleviating trade-induced in-
equality is an important objective of this paper. The framework is applied to ex-
amine to what extent education alleviates trade-induced inequality. By comparing
the transitional paths with and without human capital accumulation, the quantita-
tive experiment illustrates that education eliminates 65% of trade-induced inequal-
ity among skilled and unskilled labor.
Finally, I ask how gains from trade are distributed across generations and educa-
tional categories. By comparing the percentage gain in discounted lifetime wealth
for each group, I find that the older, more educated groups gain the most from glob-
alization, while older, less educated groups gain the least. This finding shows that
globalization can be a source of increasing intergenerational inequality, leading to an
expanding understanding of the recent heated discussion on the wealth distribution
across generations2.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related lit-
erature. Section 3 presents the theoretical model and derives the equilibrium con-
ditions for the model. Section 4 demonstrates the intuition and mechanisms of the
model using a simplified two-country and two-sector economy. Section 5 explains
the parameterization and calibration procedure. Section 6 presents the counterfac-
tual, which illustrates the dynamic effects and mechanism of trade liberalization on
education, inequality and gains from trade. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
2See Erikson and Goldthorpe (2002) and Bowles and Gintis (2002)
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2 Related Literature
Conventional Heckscher-Ohlin trade models suggest that globalization can reduce
the skill premium in developing countries and raise the skill premium in developed
countries through the reallocation of labor across sectors (i.e., the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem). However, the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model are inconsistent
with empirical evidence. As discussed in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), globaliza-
tion raises the skill premium for both developing and developed countries.
The existing theoretical and quantitative works examine the interaction between
the skill premium and trade from a wide range of perspectives, including skill-
biased technology (Burstein and Vogel 2016, Parro 2013 and Yeaple 2005), structural
change (Cravino and Sotelo 2019 and Xu 2016), and global value chain (Costinot et
al. 2012). These papers study inequality and international trade in static settings and
assume the skill supply is exogenously determined.
The assumption of inelastic skill supply excludes the potential impact of endoge-
nous human capital adjustment on the skill premium. As a result, trade patterns and
inequality are determined mainly by cross-country differences in the abundance
of skill and productivity and cross-sector differences in skill intensity. Exogenous
shocks in these models affect only relative skill demand: the quantitative results
depict movement along a vertical skill supply curve. Thus, the ensuing analysis
can potentially exaggerate changes in the skill premium. The model in this paper
includes an endogenous adjustment of skill, and a quantitative comparison of the
exact transitional paths is conducted. To be qualitatively consistent with empirical
evidence presented in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), the model also accommodates
capital-skill complementarity, as in Parro (2013) and Krusell et al. (2000).
This paper is not the first to study the interaction between international trade and
educational choice. Recent empirical studies offer compelling evidence that an indi-
vidual’s educational decisions are influenced by globalization. Hickman and Olney
(2011) study the U.S. economy and find that globalization increases the educational
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attainment of workers in the U.S. Atkin (2016) studies Mexico in the period between
1986 and 2000 and finds that export expansion in the manufacturing sector is as-
sociated with an increased high school dropout rate. Blanchard and Olney (2017)
use a panel of 102 countries over 45 years to investigate the relationship between
export composition and educational attainment. By implementing a gravity regres-
sion to eliminate endogeneity, Blanchard and Olney (2017) find that an expansion
in less skill-intensive exports depresses educational attainment, while an expansion
in skill-intensive exports increases educational attainment. These studies suggest
that the demand-side comparative advantage mechanism is empirically important
in determining aggregate educational attainment across countries.
From a theoretical and quantitative perspective, Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983)
build a two-country, two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin model with endogenous educa-
tional choice. In their model, the Stolper-Samuelson effect drives the relative return
between skilled and unskilled labor; they show that if a country with a comparative
advantage in the skill-intensive sector opens up to trade, the relative reward to skill
rises and the country becomes more skill abundant. Danziger (2017) studies a dy-
namic model of educational choice and trade of a small open economy. Blanchard
and Willmann (2016) utilize a two-country general equilibrium model to show that
the curvature of the education cost function can determine trade patterns, demon-
strating how globalization induces the polarization of skills. Themodel in this paper
considers a multicountry framework in which the skill premium and educational
choice are driven by both comparative advantages and the quality of educational
institutions. Themodel addresses effects for developed and developing countries si-
multaneously, which offers quantitative and theoretical foundations for educational
choice and international trade studied by Atkin (2016), Hickman and Olney (2011)
and Blanchard and Olney (2017).
This paper complements previous work in many aspects. The framework in this
paper adapts the procedure of Alvarez and Lucas (2007) to a dynamic setting and
contributes to the recently growing literature on dynamic trade in the multicountry
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world. Eaton et al. (2016) quantify shocks between the year 2000 and 2011 and ex-
amine the potential cause of trade collapse during the 2008 recession. Anderson et
al. (2015) build a model in which the investment rate is independent of trade cost
and compute the exact transitional dynamics of the model. Alvarez (2017) approx-
imates the model around the steady state to study the dynamics. Caliendo et al.
(2019) study trade shocks on the reallocation of workers by implementing dynamic
hat algebra. Ravikumar et al. (2019) compute the exact transitional path of capital
accumulation by reformulating a finite horizon problem. I provide a flexible and fast
algorithm for solving the dynamic multicountry model, which uses market-clearing
condition to iterate prices and utilizes the solutions of the optimization problems to
update the factor supply. The solution method computes the exact transitional path
for 40 countries and 300 periods within 1 minute on a regular laptop.
Similar to Xiang and Yeaple (2018), this paper quantifies the educational institu-
tion across countries and evaluates the implications on the comparative advantage
and aggregate economic outcomes. Hence, it also contributes to the literature on
economic institutions, e.g., Nunn and Trefler (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2001).
3 Model
Consider an economy of N countries and J sectors, where countries are indexed by
i and n and sectors are indexed by j. Within each sector j, there is a continuum of
intermediates ω ∈ [0, 1]. The international trade setting for each industry follows
Eaton and Kortum (2002). A final goods producer in each country buys sector-j
goods domestically and combines them to produce final goods. All markets are
competitive, including factor markets and goods markets.
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3.1 Workers
The economy is populated by infinitely lived individuals who face constant proba-
bility of death ζ in each period (as in Blanchard 1985). At each time period t, there
is a population of mass Li born in country i. Assume that there is no population
growth; hence, newly born individuals exactly replenish the perished population in
each period.
Upon birth, each worker draws idiosyncratic innate ability a from a Pareto dis-
tribution G(x) = 1 − x−1, x ∈ [1,∞). The realization of innate ability is directly
linked to the cost of education. Each worker decides whether to obtain higher ed-
ucation in his first period; if he chooses to pursue higher education, he becomes a
skilled worker throughout his entire lifetime. Similarly, if he chooses not to pursue
higher education, he becomes an unskilled worker throughout his entire lifetime. A
worker is endowed with one unit of time in each period. A high-skilled individual
must spend a−γi of his time in each period to maintain his educational status and
spends his remaining time earning wages as a skilled worker. An unskilled indi-
vidual uses the entirety of his time to earn wages as an unskilled worker. To be
consistent with the definition from the World-Input Database, a skilled worker is
defined as a worker with at least a tertiary degree.
The time cost of education is determined by the innate ability of each individual
and a country-specific parameter γi. The cost is inversely related to innate ability
a, i.e., the smarter an individual is, the lower the time cost to maintain his status
as a skilled worker in each period. Parameter γi captures the quality of educational
institutions in country i. Given the same level of innate ability, the larger γi is, the
less time required in each period to maintain educational status. Countries with
larger γi provide better environments for workers to pursue an education.
At time t+ s, a skilled worker in country i receives a wage of wHi,t+s, while an un-
skilledworker receiveswLi,t+s. Workers’ instantaneous utility function is logarithmic,
with future consumption discounted at a rate of β ∈ [0, 1]. Since individuals face a
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constant chance of death ζ in each period, the effective discount factor is ν = (1−ζ)β.
Each worker has perfect foresight about the aggregate economy and evaluates the
benefits of being a skilled versus unskilled worker in deciding whether to pursue
higher education. Assume individuals cannot save their income; the optimization
problem for a worker with innate ability a born in country i at time t is given by:
max
{
∞∑
s=0
νs log
([
1−
1
aγi
]
×
wHi,t+s
Pi,t+s
)
,
∞∑
s=0
νs log
(wLi,t+s
Pi,t+s
)}
. (1)
By equating the benefit of being a skilled worker versus an unskilled worker, we
derive the threshold innate ability a¯i,t. A worker with innate abilitya¯i,t in country
i born at time t is indifferent to being a skilled or unskilled worker. This threshold
ability is denoted by:
a¯i,t =
[
1−
( ∞∏
s=0
(wLi,t+s
wHi,t+s
)νs) 1∑∞s=0 νs ]− 1γi . (2)
For a worker born at time t in country i, if his innate ability is larger than a¯i,t, the ben-
efit of being a skilled worker outweighs that of being an unskilled worker; hence,
he pursues higher education. In all other instances, he does not pursue higher edu-
cation. Equation (2) denotes a key equilibrium condition, which implies that a more
efficient educational institution and higher skill premium in the subsequent periods
are associated with higher educational attainment.
3.2 Labor Supply Dynamic
The computation of the skilled and unskilled labor supply of country i at time t
requires information about the skill supply from the previous period as well as the
ability threshold of the current generation. Given a¯i,t, the average skilled labor hours
of country i and generation t are given by:∫ ∞
a¯i,t
(1−
1
xγi
)dG(x) = a¯−1i,t −
1
(1 + γi)
a¯
−(γi+1)
i,t = µi,t. (3)
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Similarly, given a¯i,t, the average unskilled labor hours of country i and generation t
are given by: ∫ a¯i,t
1
dG(x) = G(a¯i,t). (4)
Letting LHi,t and L
L
i,t be the total skilled and unskilled labor supply of country i at
time t, the transitions of skilled and unskilled labor supply can be characterized by:
LHi,t = (1− ζ)L
H
i,t−1 + µi,tLi (5)
LLi,t = (1− ζ)L
L
i,t−1 +G(a¯i,t)Li. (6)
The first term on the right-hand side of equations (5) and (6) captures the remaining
population from the existing labor force pool. Adding the supply of skilled and un-
skilled labor from newly born individuals, we arrive at the total labor supply at time
t. The evolution of the skilled and unskilled labor supply can be fully characterized
by their corresponding initial values and the paths of ability thresholds.
3.3 Production
I introduce capital-skill complementarity into the production function for each sector-
j intermediate ω. Capital, skilled workers, and unskilled workers are used to pro-
duce intermediates. The production of sector-j intermediate ω follows a technology:
M
j
i,t(ω) =
(
[δji ]
1/ρ[LH,ji,t (ω)]
ρ−1
ρ + [1− δji ]
1/ρ[Kji,t(ω)]
ρ−1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
(7)
y
j
i,t(ω) = A
j
i,t(ω)B
j
i [L
L
i,t(ω)]
αji [M ji,t(ω)]
1−αji (8)
where Kji,t(ω), L
H
i,t(ω) and L
L
i,t(ω) are the amounts of capital, skilled, and unskilled
workers, respectively, used by producer of intermediate ω. Specifically, capital and
skilled workers are combined in a CES function with an elasticity of substitution
ρ to produce M ji,t(ω). The intermediate production follows Cobb-Douglas technol-
ogy combining unskilled labor and M ji,t(ω). The input share of unskilled labor is
represented by αji , with lower values of α
j
i resulting in a more skill-intensive sector
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j. Skill intensities are heterogeneous across sectors. Additionally, the productivity
of intermediate ω of sector j in country i at time t is drawn from a Fre´chet distri-
bution F ji,t(z) = e
−T ji,tz
−θ
, where T ji,t is associated with the country-sector-specific
total factor productivity and θ determines the dispersion of the distribution. Lastly,
B
j
i = (α
j
i )
−αji (1 − αji )
−(1−αji ) is a normalizing parameter. Letting ri,t, w
H
i,t and w
L
i,t be
the capital rent and the wages of skilled and unskilled workers in country i at time
t, the unit cost to produce intermediate ω of sector j in country i at time t is given
by:
c
j
i,t(ω) =
c
j
i,t
A
j
i,t(ω)
, (9)
with
c
j
i,t = (w
L
i,t)
αji (PM,ji,t )
1−αji (10)
p
M,j
i,t =
[
δ
j
i (w
H
i,t)
1−ρ + (1− δji )(ri,t)
1−ρ
] 1
1−ρ . (11)
Sector-j goods in country i are produced using intermediates ω ∈ [0, 1] priced at
p
j
i,t(ω). Intermediates ω are either from a domestic market or foreign countries. Let-
ting Y ji,t be the total quantity of sector-j goods in country i produced at time t and
q
j
i,t(ω) be the total quantity of intermediate ω used by sector j in country i at time t,
the production of sector-j goods follows a CES technology:
Y
j
i,t =
(∫ 1
0
[qji,t(ω)]
η−1
η dω
) η
η−1
, (12)
where η is the elasticity of substitution within a sector. Sector-j price index in coun-
try i at time t is given by:
P
j
i,t =
(∫ 1
0
[pji,t(ω)]
1−ηdω
) 1
1−η
. (13)
The final goods producer in country i combines sectoral goods from the domestic
market priced at P ji,t. Letting Yi,t be the total output of final goods in country i at
time t and qji,t be the amount of sectoral goods used by the final good production,
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the production of the final good follows a CES technology:
Yi,t =
(
J∑
j=1
[qji,t]
σ−1
σ
) σ
1−σ
, (14)
where ρ is the elasticity of substitution across sectors. The price index in country i
at time t is given by:
Pi,t =
[
J∑
j=1
(P ji,t)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
(15)
The total expenditure on the sector-j good in the production of the final good in
country i at time t is given by:
E
j
i,t =
(
P
j
i,t
Pi,t
) 1
1−σ
× Pi,tYi,t (16)
3.4 Capital Supply
For simplicity, assume a representative household in each country dictates the deci-
sion of capital investment: individuals do not make the decision regarding invest-
ment. Instead, the head of household in country imaximizes the following lifetime
welfare function:
Ui =
∞∑
t=0
νt log(Ci,t), (17)
with resource constraints:
Wi,t = w
H
i,tL
H
i,t + w
L
i,tL
L
i,t + ri,tKi,t (18)
Wi,t
Pi,t
= Ci,t + Ii,t (19)
Ki,t+1 = (1− δ)Ki,t + Ii,t, (20)
where Ci,t and Ii,t are the real consumption and real investment, respectively, of
country i at time t, and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. The representative
household in each country collects all nominal income from workers and capital
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and then allocates resources between real consumption Ci,t and capital investment
Ii,t by solving the optimization problem. Equation (20) captures the law of motion
of capital stock in country i.
As stated previously, the representative household has perfect foresight. Solving
the maximization problem, the Euler’s equations are given by:
λi,t =
1
Ci,t
(21)
− λi,t + νλi,t+1
[
ri,t+1
Pi,t+1
+ (1− δ)
]
= 0 (22)
Wi,t
Pi,t
= Ci,t +Ki,t+1 − (1− δ)Ki,t. (23)
The dynamics of capital are governed by the Euler’s equations. These conditions pin
down the transition of capital supply for each country. Combining this information
with the transition of skill supply, we can solve the factor supply for every country
at each time period.
3.5 International Trade
The iceberg trade cost of delivering one unit of a sector-j intermediate from country
i to n is denoted by dji,n ≥ 1. Hence, the unit cost of producing sector-j interme-
diate ω in country i after delivering to country n is given by cji,n,t(ω) = c
j
i,t(ω)d
j
i,n.
Since the market is competitive, the sector-j good producer in country n buys each
intermediate ω from the cheapest source, and the price of intermediate ω is given
by:
p
j
i,n,t(ω) = min
i
{
c
j
i,n,t(ω)
}
. (24)
Following Eaton and Kortum (2002) to solve trade share and sectoral price in-
dices, the probability of country n buying sector-j intermediates from country i at
time t is
pi
j
i,n,t =
T
j
i,t(d
j
i,nc
j
i,t)
−θ∑N
i′=1 T
j
k,t(d
j
i′,nc
j
i′,tc
j
i′,t)
−θ
=
T
j
i,t(d
j
i,nc
j
i,t)
−θ
Φjn,t
. (25)
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pi
j
i,n,t is also n’s expenditure share on i in sector j. Let E
j
i,n,t be the total sector-j
intermediate export from country i to country n at time t, given by
E
j
i,n,t = pi
j
i,n,tE
j
n,t =
T
j
i,t(d
j
i,nc
j
i,t)
−θ
Φjn,t
E
j
n,t. (26)
Equation (26) is the gravity equation, where θ is trade elasticity, i.e., the elasticity of
export with respect to trade costs. A smaller dispersion of productivity across coun-
tries corresponds to higher trade elasticity since trade flows are more responsive to
trade costs when countries are more similar in the distribution of productivity.
The price index for sector j in country n at time t is given by:
P
j
n,t =
[ ∫ 1
0
p
j
n,t(ω)
1−ηdω
] 1
1−η
=Γ
(
θ − 1 + η
θ
)
× [Φjn,t]
− 1
θ , (27)
where Γ(·) is a gamma function.
3.6 General Equilibrium
Assuming trade is balanced for simplicity, the goods markets and all factor markets
clear for every country and all time periods in the general equilibrium. The sectoral
goods are cleared if the following condition holds for each i, j, and t:
E
j
i,t = P
j
i,tY
j
i,t =
N∑
n=1
pi
j
i,n,tE
j
n,t, (28)
where Eji,t is the value of gross output of sector j in country i at time t. Equilibrium
also requires total spending to equal total income for each country and each time
period,
Pi,tYi,t = w
H
i,tL
H
i,t + w
L
i,tL
L
i,t + ri,tKi,t. (29)
Since factors can freely move across sectors but are unable to move across coun-
tries, factor prices are equalized across sectors within each country. The market
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clearing conditions for capital, skilled, and unskilled labor in country i at time t is
ri,tKi,t =
J∑
j=1

(1− αji )(1− δji )
(
ri,t
P
M,j
i,t
)1−ρ N∑
n=1
pi
j
i,n,tX
j
n,t

 (30)
wHi,tL
H
i,t =
J∑
j=1

(1− αji )δji
(
wHi,t
P
M,j
i,t
)1−ρ N∑
n=1
pi
j
i,n,tX
j
n,t

 (31)
wLi,tL
L
i,t =
J∑
j=1
[
α
j
i
N∑
n=1
pi
j
i,n,tX
j
n,t
]
. (32)
The left-hand side of equations (30) to (32) is the total income of each factor in coun-
try i at time t, and the right-hand side is the total payment to each factor. In equilib-
rium, these market clearing conditions hold across all i and all t.
Given all equilibrium conditions, including the solutions to maximization prob-
lems, trade shares, and price indices, the equilibrium is defined in the following
manner. Denoting economic fundamentals at time t as Ψt, which includes bilateral
trade cost dji,n,t, ∀i, n ∈ N, j ∈ J , and productivity T
j
i,t, ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ J , these vari-
ables can potentially be time-varying but are deterministic and converge at some
constants. The initial condition, denoted as Θ0, includes initial factor supply Ki,0,
LHi,0 and L
L
i,0 ∀i. Given Θ0 and {Ψt}
∞
t=0, an equilibrium is composed of sequences of
factor prices and factor supply {ri,t, w
H
i,t, w
L
i,t, Ki,t, L
H
i,t, L
L
i,t}
∞
t=0, ∀i ∈ N such that all
equilibrium conditions and market clearing conditions are satisfied.
Steady-state equilibrium can be defined similarly. Given steady-state fundamen-
tal Ψ∗, which includes trade cost dji,n, ∀i, n ∈ N, j ∈ J and T
j
i , ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ J , a
steady-state equilibrium is {ri, w
H
i , w
L
i , Ki, L
H
i , L
L
i }, ∀i ∈ N such that all equilibrium
conditions and market clearing conditions are satisfied.3
3See Appendix (??) for the equilibrium conditions of the steady state and the algorithm to com-
pute both the steady state and transitional path.
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Parameters Value
Elasticity of substitution across sectors: σ 2.2
Elasticity of substitution within sectors: η 2.7
Elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital: ρ 1
Productivity dispersion: θ 4
Unskilled labor intensity in manufacturing: αM 0.7
Unskilled labor intensity in service: αS 0.3
Skill share relative to capital: δj 0.7
Population: Li 1
Table 1: Baseline parameters used in the simplified cases.
4 Special Cases
To demonstrate important channels driving this model, this section implements a
simplified and numerical version for a world with two countries, North and South,
and with two sectors, service and manufacturing. This numerical model allows me
to quantitatively study the implications of the model with respect to the skill pre-
mium, skill share, relative export share, and real income. In this section, I focus on
these economic variables that vary in the steady state as the economic environment
changes.
Table (1) presents my baseline values for parameters that are used for the quan-
titative experiments in the simplified environment. When possible, the parameter
values chosen are common in the literature. The elasticity of substitution between
skilled labor and capital is set to ρ = 1 to eliminate capital-skill complementarity
in order to emphasize other mechanisms. The payment shares to unskilled labor in
manufacturing and service are set to 0.7 and 0.3, respectively. Hence, the manufac-
turing sector is more unskilled-labor intensive.
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4.1 The Comparative Advantage Mechanism
In the first numerical experiment, I give the North a comparative advantage in the
service sector by imposing T ji = 1 for all i and j, except for T
service
North = 2. To eliminate
heterogeneity for educational institution, I set educational efficiencies to γi = 1 for
both the North and the South. Iceberg costs are set to dji,n = 3 for i 6= n so that the
numerical model features trade friction. As a result, the North has a comparative
advantage in the high-skilled sector, while the South has a comparative advantage
in the low-skilled sector. The quantitative experiment gradually reduces the trade
cost until trade barriers are completely eliminated.The changes in skill premium
and skill share relative to the baseline equilibrium are recorded.
Panels (1a) and (1b) in Figure (1) present the changes in skill premium and skill
share for this experiment. As predicted by Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the reduc-
tion in trade costs causes the factors to be allocated toward the sector having a com-
parative advantage in each country. Since the North has a comparative advantage
in the high-skilled sector, its export share in the high-skilled sector starts to climb,
and the between-sector reallocation induced by the trade costs reduction increases
the skill premium in the North. In response to the higher skill premium, workers in
the North seek more education, so educational attainment also rises. These changes
in educational outcomes reflect the outward shift of relative skill demand along a
positively sloped skill supply. As a result, the relative price rises, and the relative
quantity falls. The opposite occurs in the South since it has a comparative advantage
in the low-skilled sector.
The result of this quantitative experiment echoes the prediction of Findlay and
Kierzkowski (1983) that trade liberalization induces skill upgrading and downgrad-
ing according to a country’s comparative advantage. The results are also consistent
with the empirical findings of Blanchard and Olney (2017) that export expansions
in high-skilled sectors are associated with an increase in educational attainment.
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Figure 1: The steady-state effects of trade cost removal. (1a) Changes (%) in skill premium.
(1b) Changes (%) in skill share. (1c) Changes (%) in exports of the high-skilled sector relative
to low-skilled sector. (1d) Changes (%) in real income per capita.
4.2 The Educational Institution Mechanism
In this subsection, the educational institution mechanism is studied. To emphasize
the effect of educational institution, the comparative advantage channel is elimi-
nated by assuming that the productivities across countries and sectors are the same,
T
j
i = 1 for all i, j. Additionally, d
j
i,n = 1 for all j, i, n is imposed to remove trade
friction. The goal of these assumptions is to isolate the effect of educational institu-
tions on the economy. The values of educational efficiency γi are set to 1 for both
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Figure 2: The steady-state effects of increasing educational efficiency in the North. (2a)
Changes (%) in skill premium. (2b) Changes (%) in skill share. (2c) Changes (%) in exports
of the high-skilled sector relative to the low-skilled sector. (2d) Changes (%) in real income
per capita.
countries in the baseline. The quantitative experiment entails gradually increasing
the North’s educational efficiency until it reaches 2 while holding everything else
unchanged and recording the changes in economic outcomes.
Panels (2a) and (2b) in Figure (2) show that as the North’s educational institu-
tions becomemore efficient, the skill premium in the North falls and the educational
attainment in the North rises. However, an improvement in the North’s educational
institutions does not have a significant impact on the South’s labor market, as it
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slightly reduces the skill premium and the skill share in the South.
Even though improvement in the North’s educational efficiency has only a min-
imal impact on the South’s labor market, it has a significant impact on the pattern
of specialization. Panel (2c) in Figure (2) shows that as the North’s educational in-
stitution improves, the North exports relatively more high-skilled goods, while the
South exports relatively more low-skilled goods. That is, the North starts to special-
ize in high-skilled sectors, and the South specializes in low-skilled sectors.
This example demonstrates that differences in educational institutions across
countries can be a source of comparative advantage. Countries with more robust
educational institutions are more capable of providing skilled labor; hence, they are
also more likely to specialize in high-skilled sectors. This characteristic suggests that
educational policies can be used as instruments in determining patterns of interna-
tional trade and specialization.
5 Parameterization
Model parameters are either taken from the literature, estimated, or calibrated. Us-
ing data from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), as discussed in Timmer et
al. (2015), I calibrate the parameters of my model to match observations in the year
2001. Assuming the world is in a steady state in 2001, the model is parameterized to
40 countries and 6 sectors aggregated from 33 industries4 using bilateral trade data
from the World Input-Output Table (WIOT) and production data from the Socio-
economic Accounts (SEA). Tables (5) and (6) in the Appendix list the countries and
industries included in my sample.
4See Table (7) in the appendix for details of the aggregation.
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5.1 Common Parameters
The following parameters are assumed to be shared across countries and invariant
overtime: elasticities, factor shares for each industry, constant probability of death,
discount factor, and the rate of capital depreciation.
Following the estimation of Simonovska andWaugh (2014), trade elasticity is set
to θ = 4. To match the median 5-digit SITC and 3-digit elasticity of substitution
between 1990 and 2001 estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006), I set elasticity of
substitution within sector to η = 2.7 and that across sector to σ = 2.2. The estimation
of Krusell et al. (2000) is adopted to set the elasticity of substitution between skilled
labor and capital to ρ = 0.67. I set the constant probability of death ζ = 0.025;
hence, on average, workers stay in the labor force for 40 years. Finally, the capital
depreciation rate is set to δ = 0.05, and the discount factor is set to β = 0.98.
For factor shares, I assume αji and δ
j
i are the same across all countries but differ
across industries. On the basis of U.S. data in 2001 from the SEA as the baseline,
the values of αji are set to match the expenditure share on unskilled labor and the
values of δji are set to match the expenditure share on skilled labor relative to capital
for each industry. See Table (8) in Appendix (A) for the values of factor shares for
each industry.
5.2 Country-specific Parameters and Trade Costs
The total labor force Li in each country is set to match the total number of employees
in the SEA. The SEA dataset also enables me to compute the skill share, the skill
premium, and nominal wages for skilled and unskilled labor. See Appendix (??) for
further details.
To estimate bilateral trade costs, I assume that trade costs take the form
d
j
i,n = (Disti,n)
bj1 × exp(bj2 × borderi,n + b
j
3 × languagei,n + b
j
4 × colonyi,n). (33)
This specification captures geographical barriers across countries, where Disti,n is
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Parameters Value
Elasticity of substitution across sectors: σ 2.2
Elasticity of substitution within sectors: η 2.7
Elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital: ρ 0.67
Trade elasticity: θ 4
Rate of capital depreciation: δ 0.05
Probability of death: ζ 0.025
Discount factor: β 0.98
Factor shares: αj and δj U.S. data
Table 2: Common parameters
the distance between i and n and borderi,n = 1 if i and n do not share border. Simi-
larly, languagei,n and colonyi,n refer, respectively, to whether i and n share a common
official language and whether they share colonial history. The data on the geogra-
phy for each country pair are from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations
Internationales (CEPII). Combining the specification of trade costs with the gravity
structure, the empirical specification is given by:
logEji,n =b
′j
1 logDi,n + b
′j
2 × borderi,n + b
′j
3 × languagei,n + b
′j
4 × colonyi,n
+ Exporterji + Importer
j
n + ε
j
i,n, (34)
where Exporterji and Importer
j
n are exporter and importer dummies, respectively.
Using data for 2001, equation (34) is estimated industry-by-industry via ordinary
least squares. Given the value of trade elasticity θ, the parameters of iceberg trade
costs for each industry can be recovered by bj = −θbˆ′
j
. See Table (10) in Appendix
(??) for the estimated parameters for trade costs in each industry. The productivity
for each (i, j) is calculated by Tˆ ji = exp(
ˆExporter
j
i )(c
j
i,t)
θ, where cji,t is computed
using the factor prices and shares from the WIOD.
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5.3 Calibrating the Educational Efficiency
The only remaining unspecified parameter is the educational efficiency γi for each
country. The educational efficiency γi is calibrated such that the steady-state skill
premium in the model matches the skill premium in the data. Details of the calibra-
tion procedure can be found in Appendix (??).
Figure (3) illustrates the calibrated value of educational efficiency for each coun-
try. In general, more developed countries have more efficient educational systems,
while less developed countries have less efficient educational systems. Countries
with the most efficient educational systems are welfare states such as Denmark,
Sweden, and Finland. Larger developing countries, such as Indonesia and India,
have the least efficient educational systems.
The quality of educational institutions across countries is difficult to evaluate.
Recently, the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) has gained con-
siderable attention as a measure for cross-country comparison of educational sys-
tems. The PISA score has become the most commonly used measure for global
educational rankings, although this approach is not without criticism5.
To check whether the educational efficiency derived from the model resonates
with real-world measures, the calibrated educational parameters γi are compared
against year 2003 PISA scores in both math and reading. The results are summa-
rized in Figure (4), which shows that calibrated educational efficiency is positively
and strongly correlated with PISA scores. The correlation coefficients are 0.74 and
0.75 for PISA scores in math and reading, respectively, and the rank correlation co-
efficients are 0.79 and 0.80 (see Table (9)).
Xiang and Yeaple (2018) also use a general equilibrium framework and trade
data to quantify the quality of educational systems across countries, and they em-
phasize the educational quality in the dimensions of cognitive and noncognitive
skills. Similarly, my structure provides a cross-country comparison of educational
5See Hanushek and Woessmann (2011) and Xiang and Yeaple (2018)
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Figure 3: Calibrated educational institution parameter γi.
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Figure 4: Calibrated educational institution parameter γi and PISA scores.
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institutions using publicly available data and does not rely on direct measures of
the educational system in each country. The calibrated educational efficiency across
countries exhibits a pattern similar to that of the most commonly used measure for
global ranking of educational systems. This method is useful for the evaluation
of educational quality in countries or regions that lack detailed information about
their educational system: evaluations can be conducted using only the structure of
the model and publicly available data.
5.4 Model Fit
The calibrated parameters are used to compute the steady state of the model. Figure
(5) plots the skill premium and skill share in the data and in the steady state of
the calibrated model. The skill premium is the targeted moment, and the model
matches the data almost perfectly, with a correlation coefficient of 1. For skill share,
the correlation coefficient between the data and the model is 0.6, even though the
skill share is not the targeted moment. Figure (5) shows a negative relationship
between skill premium and skill share in the data, with a correlation coefficient of
-0.59. The model preserves this negative relationship, with a correlation coefficient
of -0.83. In summary, the model matches the skill premium perfectly and preserves
the negative relationship between the skill premium and the skill share observed in
the data.
6 Counterfactual: Trade Liberalization
In this section, I study the effect of unanticipated permanent trade liberalization.
The trade liberalization corresponds to a uniform reduction in iceberg trade costs.
At period t = 0, the economy begins in a calibrated steady state. At period t = 1,
iceberg trade costs fall by 25% unexpectedly for each country pair and each sector.
Then, I compute the corresponding exact transitional paths for all countries and
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Figure 5: Model fit for the educational outcomes in the baseline steady-state equilibrium
and the data. Horizontal axis for the skill share, and vertical axis for the skill premium.
quantify the impacts on educational outcome, labor market, and international trade.
Solving the transitional path for all 40 countries simultaneously is a daunting task
since it involves finding solutions in a vast state space. I adapt the algorithm of
Alvarez and Lucas (2007) to this dynamic framework by incorporating perfect fore-
sight. The method I use is efficient, as the computation of the full transitional paths
for 300 periods and 40 countries takes less than 1 minute. See Appendix (??) for
details of the algorithm.
6.1 Changes in the Skill Premium and Skill Share
Figure (6) plots the percentage changes in the skill share and skill premium relative
to the baseline steady-state equilibrium for each country. The skill premium and
skill share rise by 0.93% and 1.71% on average, respectively, but vary widely across
countries. The skill premium rises as much as 1.32% in Brazil, 1.35% in India, and
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Figure 6: Steady-state changes (%) in the skill premium and skill share resulting from an
unanticipated 25% trade cost reduction.
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Figure 7: Transitional paths for the changes (%) in the skill premium and skill share in the
U.S. resulting from an unanticipated 25% trade cost reduction.
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Skill Skill Capital Real Wage Real Wage Average Real
Premium Share Supply for Skilled for Unskilled Real Wage Income
Country (wHi /w
L
i ) (L
H
i /L
L
i ) (Ki) (w
H
i /Pi) (w
L
i /Pi) (wi/Pi) (Yi/Pi)
AUS 0.81 1.29 23.53 30.45 29.40 29.98 28.85
AUT 0.50 0.96 14.92 20.75 20.15 20.48 19.74
BEL 0.35 0.73 8.63 13.26 12.86 13.08 12.47
BGR 1.07 1.76 23.57 28.90 27.54 28.23 27.03
BRA 1.32 1.91 28.70 34.39 32.63 33.51 32.27
CAN 0.37 0.82 9.19 13.46 13.04 13.26 12.57
CHN 1.12 1.89 26.32 32.78 31.31 32.01 30.41
CYP 0.69 1.23 19.88 26.73 25.86 26.34 25.33
CZE 0.71 1.25 18.99 24.61 23.73 24.20 23.23
DEU 0.45 0.88 15.74 21.24 20.70 20.99 20.25
DNK 0.45 1.19 19.21 24.73 24.17 24.48 23.63
ESP 0.64 1.23 20.32 26.27 25.47 25.90 24.96
EST 0.84 1.59 21.31 27.00 25.94 26.50 25.34
FIN 0.53 1.31 14.87 21.64 21.00 21.35 20.41
FRA 0.48 0.89 17.03 22.29 21.71 22.03 21.30
GBR 0.49 0.99 17.29 22.96 22.35 22.69 21.91
GRC 0.80 1.32 20.88 27.35 26.34 26.88 25.78
HUN 0.72 1.13 20.99 26.69 25.79 26.28 25.28
IDN 1.40 1.96 29.14 35.38 33.51 34.41 32.93
IND 1.35 1.80 26.75 32.54 30.77 31.63 30.25
IRL 0.64 1.37 11.61 18.45 17.69 18.13 17.19
ITA 0.53 0.92 18.35 25.00 24.35 24.70 23.81
JPN 0.41 0.85 16.32 23.70 23.19 23.46 22.50
KOR 0.56 1.11 17.71 24.92 24.23 24.60 23.47
LTU 0.92 1.71 21.87 27.69 26.52 27.12 25.89
LUX 0.55 1.04 8.96 14.78 14.15 14.52 13.88
LVA 1.00 1.72 22.19 28.23 26.96 27.61 26.38
MEX 0.71 1.05 22.09 27.89 26.98 27.45 26.43
MLT 0.60 0.95 19.37 25.64 24.89 25.31 24.42
NLD 0.50 1.04 15.01 20.27 19.68 20.01 19.20
POL 0.74 1.36 20.16 25.40 24.48 24.97 24.01
PRT 0.74 1.06 19.65 26.33 25.40 25.90 24.91
ROU 0.93 1.59 24.31 30.30 29.10 29.71 28.47
RUS 1.21 2.02 26.95 31.96 30.38 31.13 29.97
SVK 0.79 1.54 18.50 24.54 23.56 24.07 22.91
SVN 0.63 1.01 17.55 23.91 23.13 23.55 22.63
SWE 0.44 1.19 17.99 24.76 24.21 24.51 23.61
TUR 1.09 1.54 23.98 29.53 28.14 28.84 27.73
TWN 0.48 0.87 17.29 24.30 23.71 24.03 23.01
USA 0.57 1.00 18.70 25.60 24.88 25.28 24.37
Average 0.73 1.28 19.40 25.41 24.50 24.98 23.97
Table 3: Steady-state changes (%) resulting from an unanticipated 25% trade cost
reduction.
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1.40% in Indonesia and as little as 0.37% in Canada and 0.35% in Belgium. Skill
share rises as much as 2.02% in Russia, 1.96% in India, and 1.89% in China and as
little as 0.87% in Taiwan, 0.85% in Japan, and 0.73% in Belgium. The changes in
the steady state for economic variables across countries are summarized in Table
(3). Note that contrary to the prediction of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the skill
premium increases in all countries. For both developed and developing countries,
workers with higher education gain more from trade, resulting in growing inequal-
ity between educational categories. This result suggests that capital-skill comple-
mentarity is the dominant force in shaping educational outcomes and inequality.
Skill share changes in the same direction as skill premium, since the changes in the
educational outcome in a steady state reflect movements along positively sloped
relative skill supply curves.
Figure (7) illustrates the transitional paths of skill premium and relative skill
supply in the U.S. The skill premium rises rapidly after trade liberalization, and
peaks at t = 6. As shown in Figure (7), the skill premium increases by 1.25% at
the peak. In the early stage of the transition, older generations are unable to adjust
their educational status, resulting in a slow adjustment of human capital. Relative
skill supply climbs slowly along the transitional path after trade liberalization. As
demonstrated in Figure (7), this leads to an eventual 1.26% increase in relative skill
supply. In the long run, the adjustment of human capital affects the skill premium;
as more people become skilled workers, the skill premium falls and converges to
the new steady state following the trade liberalization. In the new steady state, the
skill premium rises by 0.57%, and human capital accumulation eliminates 54% of
the increased skill premium from the peak in the U.S. The transitional paths of other
countries are similar to that of the U.S.
In summary, trade liberalization raises the skill premium and educational attain-
ment in all countries in the new steady state. On the transitional path, inequality
resulting from trade liberalization is more severe in the early stage of the transi-
tion than in the long term. Moreover, inequality decreases as future generations
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gradually accumulate more human capital. The adjustment of education alleviates
approximately half of the transitory inequality.
6.2 Channels Affecting the Transition Paths
Twomain components are included in themodel: physical capital accumulation and
human capital accumulation. The interaction between these two components drives
the transitional behavior of the economic outcomes in each country. By turning each
component on and off, various channels can be isolated and studied.
First, I compute the baseline steady-state equilibrium using the calibrated pa-
rameters and store the steady-state level of capital supply and human capital sup-
ply. To deactivate capital accumulation under trade shocks, I force capital supply
to be at the baseline steady-state level while computing the full transitional path.
Human capital accumulation is deactivated in a similar manner.
In the short term, all factors are unable to adjust promptly. Deactivating both
capital and human capital accumulation illustrates the economic consequences in
the short run. At this stage, the outcome is driven by the comparative advantage
channel. The skill premium rises in countries with a comparative advantage in high-
skilled sectors and falls in countries with a comparative advantage in low-skilled
sectors. Since physical capital adjusts faster than human capital, activating only
capital accumulation accentuates the economic impacts in the medium run. In the
medium run, active channels include the comparative advantage effect and the skill-
biased technology effect induced by capital accumulation. Lastly, in the long run,
all factors can freely adjust, and all components are active; hence, the full model
corresponds to the long-run case. The long-run case features all channels, including
all channels mentioned above and educational effects. These different scenarios and
the corresponding mechanisms are summarized in Table (4).
The exact transitional paths are calculated for all cases and all countries. Figure
(8) shows the evolution of the Mexican skill premium following a 25% reduction
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Cases
Factor Supply Active Channel
Skill Capital Comparative Skill-Biased Education
Advantage Technology
(1) Short run ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗
(2) Medium run ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
(3) Long run ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 4: Different scenarios and the corresponding active components and mecha-
nisms.
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Figure 8: Transitional paths of the changes (%) in the Mexican skill premium for different
cases resulting from an unanticipated 25% trade cost reduction.
in bilateral trade costs in each case. When all components are inactive (short-run
case), the skill premium in Mexico drops immediately after the trade liberalization
and reaches the steady state after one period. The decline in Mexican skill premium
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suggests that Mexico has a comparative advantage in low-skilled sectors.
When only capital accumulation is active (medium-run case), the immediate de-
cline in skill premium is preserved, followed by drastic increases in skill premium in
the early stage of transition. Then, the skill premium reaches the peak and plateaus.
This outcome reflects the fact that capital becomes cheaper after trade liberalization;
hence, a household head invests more intensively in physical capital. The rapid ac-
cumulation of capital, along with the capital-skill complementarity, boosts the pro-
ductivity and the demand of skilled workers. As a result, the skill premium rises
rapidly. In this particular case, the absence of educational choice pushes the steady-
state skill premium higher than the peak level on the transitional path of the full
model.
As all components are active (long-run case), future generations can choose their
educational status freely. Since younger generations know that the skill premium
will become higher in the future, more people choose to pursue higher education.
This adjustment in human capital counteracts the effect of capital accumulation on
the skill premium. As a result, the skill premium falls gradually along the transi-
tional path and converges to a level higher than that in the baseline equilibrium.
Since the capital-skill complementarity is the dominant force in all countries, the
transitional paths for the medium- and long-run cases across countries are similar.
The immediate reaction in each country is determined by whether the country has
a comparative advantage in low-skilled or high-skilled sectors.
A similar pattern of the skill premium, as implied by the full model, has been
observed in recent trade liberalization episodes. Mexico joined the General Agree-
ment on Tariff and Trade (GATT) in 1986, and trade barriers inMexico were substan-
tially reduced. Atolia and Kurokawa (2016) show that although the skill premium
in Mexico increased rapidly between 1986 to 1994, it subsequently declined in the
long term. Bai et al. (2019) record a continuous rise in the Chinese skill premium af-
ter China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002. The Chinese
skill premium peaked in 2009 and has since exhibited a non-temporary declining
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trend. Kim and Topel (2007) document a similar pattern in Korea after the Korean
government implemented a series of trade liberalization policies in the 1970s. The
real-world transitional behavior of the skill premium resulting from globalization
can be explained by the flexibility to adjust the factor supply. The faster adjustment
of physical capital, together with the capital-skill complementarity, explain the dra-
matic increase in skill premium in the early stage of the transition. Young genera-
tions make their educational choice accordingly, but it takes a long time for future
generations to populate the labor force fully. Hence, the human capital accumula-
tion only starts to neutralize the impact of trade liberalization until later stages. This
quantitative experiment suggests that physical capital and human capital accumu-
lation are crucial elements in shaping the evolution of income inequality between
educational categories.
6.3 Education and Trade-Induced Inequality
Table (13) records the percentage change in skill premium for all countries for short-
, medium- and long-run cases in the steady states. When only the comparative
advantage channel is active, the skill premium drops in 32 of 40 countries. The
capital-skill complementarity dominates in all countries, resulting in an eventual in-
crease in the skill premium for all countries. To investigate to what extent education
eliminates inequality engendered by trade liberalization, I compare the percentage
changes in the steady state for cases with and without the educational effect, which
corresponds to the medium-run and long-run cases. The difference in skill premium
between these two cases is the proportion of globalization-induced inequality elim-
inated by education. The results are summarized in Figure (9) and Table (13). I find
that education eliminates 57.37% to 72.96% of trade-induced inequality, with an av-
erage rate of 64.51%. This quantitative analysis suggests that education is a very
effective instrument in combating trade-induced inequality.
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Figure 9: Changes(%) in the skill premium resulting from an unanticipated 25% trade cost
reduction for both the long-run case and the medium-run case.
6.4 Intergenerational Distribution of Gains from Trade
Table (3) shows the percentage change in terms of real wages for all educational
categories and all countries relative to the baseline steady state. In all countries, both
skilled and unskilledworkers gain from trade liberalization. Average real wages rise
as much as 34.41% in Indonesia, 33.51% in Brazil, and 32.01% in China and as little
as 13.08% in Belgium, 13.26% in Canada, and 14.52% in Luxembourg. The average
increase in real wages is 24.98%.
The dynamic structure of my framework allows me to further explore the dis-
tribution of gains from trade not only across educational categories but also across
generations. LetW ei,t be the lifetime earnings for the group born at time t in country
iwith educational category e, where e ∈ {skilled, unskilled}. W ei,t follows
W ei,t =
∞∑
s=0
νs
(
wei,t+s
Pi,t+s
)
, (35)
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Figure 10: Changes in lifetime earnings (%) for each generation and each educational cate-
gory in the U.S. resulting from trade liberalization.
which is a measure of welfare for people who born at time t in country i with edu-
cational status e along the transitional path. I calculate the lifetime earnings for each
group under the baseline equilibrium path and the transitional path under trade
liberalization. The percentage difference inW ei,t relative to the baseline equilibrium
captures the welfare gains for each generation and each group.6
Figure (10) depicts the percentage change in the lifetime earnings relative to the
baseline for each generation and educational category in the U.S. For any gener-
ations, skilled workers gain more from trade than do unskilled workers because
capital-skill complementarity is the dominant force: trade liberalization favors skilled
workers over unskilled workers. By comparing the distribution of gains from trade
among skilled workers, following Figure (10), we can observe that older skilled
6Ravikumar et al. (2019) use consumption-equivalent units to define the dynamic gains from
trade.
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workers benefit relatively more from globalization because they enjoy a path of skill
premium that is higher than the new steady state and can reap the benefit from the
drastic transitory inequality. Future generations of skilled workers still gain sub-
stantially from trade liberalization but not as much as their older counterparts. The
reason is that as the economy progresses, it also becomes more stable; hence, there
is less room for future skilled workers to exploit.
The distribution of gains from trade among unskilled workers shows that the
oldest group gains the least. Subsequent generations of unskilled workers gain rel-
atively more but never attain the same gains as their skilled counterparts. Old and
unskilled workers gain the least from international trade; they are the losers of glob-
alization because they suffer from two hits. The first is that globalization tends to
favor skilled workers; hence, unskilled workers generally gain less from trade. The
second reason is that, for old and unskilled workers, in the early stage of their life,
they face the widest income gap between skilled and unskilled workers; hence, they
suffer even more from the transitory inequality. Other countries show similar pat-
terns in the distribution of welfare to that of the U.S.
In summary, trade liberalization favors older andmore educated generations the
most, and subsequent generations do not gain as much. The group that gains the
least is the oldest and uneducated generation. These results show that the distribu-
tion of gains from trade is not only unequal across educational categories but also
unequal across generations, which suggests that globalization is a potential cause
of rising intergenerational inequality. The results from my analysis echo the sen-
timents of recent antiglobalization movements, for example, Occupy Wall Street in
the U.S., the Five StarsMovement in Italy, and the YellowVestsMovement in France.
The results also provide new perspectives to consider the potential consequences of
globalization so that we can think about policies to remedy these consequences.
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7 Conclusion
This paper construct a dynamic multicountry trade model incorporating both hu-
man capital accumulation and physical capital accumulation to study the dynamics
of trade-induced inequality. Via a quantitative exercise, the transitional dynamics
of trade-induced inequality are shown to be closely related to adjustments in factor
supply. Upon an unanticipated trade liberalization, both capital and skill supply
do not respond to the shock immediately. In the short run, comparative advantage
is the main driving force that shifts relative demand to skilled labor, resulting in
changes in the skill premium. Adjustment of physical capital is more flexible than
education; the drastic increase in the skill premium in the early stage of the tran-
sition reflects the rapid capital accumulation and the capital-skill complementarity.
In the long run, future generations make educational decisions based on prospects
of the economy, and they gradually succeed older generations in the existing pop-
ulation. The slow adjustment in the skill supply shapes the eventual outcome of
trade-induced inequality. This quantitative result is consistent with observations
from recent trade liberalization episodes in Mexico, Korea, and China.
The analysis of the dynamics also indicates that education is an effective means
for combating inequality associated with globalization. The adjustment in human
capital reduces transitory inequality by 65%. Furthermore, the educational institu-
tion is a source of comparative advantage. A countrywith amore robust educational
institution is more likely to specialize in skill-intensive sectors.
This framework has implications for the intergenerational distribution of gains
from trade. Older educated generations benefit the most from globalization, as they
can take full advantage of the transitory inequality to accumulate more wealth in
the early stage of the transition. Old uneducated groups are the relative losers from
globalization. Recently, there has been considerable discussion in policy and press
circles about rising intergenerational inequality. This paper offers a theoretical foun-
dation to view this issue — it suggests that globalization is a potential source of the
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rising intergenerational inequality.
This tractable framework can be used to address broader questions about both
trade and educational policies. Many developing countries have implemented poli-
cies aiming to promote higher educational attainment and increased exports at the
same time. The model indicates that improving the quality of educational institu-
tions in countries with a comparative advantage in low-skilled sectors may reduce
total exports, which could result in trade-offs between education and exports. This
framework offers a tool for policymakers to carefully design and examine possible
interactions among trade and educational policies and, in turn, makemore informed
decisions.
In future research, this framework can be extended and applied to different eco-
nomic issues. By applying the model to province- or state-level data, researchers
would be able to compare educational institutions across locations within a coun-
try and study the implications on migration and trade. This type of comparison is
vital for the educational administration for allocating limited resources across loca-
tions efficiently. Retraining programs such as Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)
in the U.S. provide opportunities for workers who are impacted by trade to retrain
and gain additional work-related skills. Introducing a retraining program into this
model can help in analyzing economic benefits and costs of such programs and also
the relevant effects on trade patterns and transitory costs of inequality.
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A Tables
ISO Code Country Name ISO Code Country Name
AUS Australia JPN Japan
AUT Austria KOR Republic of Korea
BEL Belgium LVA Latvia
BRA Brazil LTU Lithuania
BGR Bulgaria LUX Luxembourg
CAN Canada MLT Malta
CHN China MEX Mexico
CYP Cyprus NLD Netherlands
CZE Czech Republic POL Poland
DNK Denmark PRT Portugal
EST Estonia ROU Romania
FIN Finland RUS Russia
FRA France SVK Slovak Republic
DEU Germany SVN Slovenia
GRC Greece ESP Spain
HUN Hungary SWE Sweden
IND India TWN Taiwan
IDN Indonesia TUR Turkey
IRL Ireland GBR United Kingdom
ITA Italy USA United States
Table 5: List of countries
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Industry code Description
AtB Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing
C Mining and Quarrying
15t16 Food, Beverages and Tobacco
17t18 Textiles and Textile Products
19 Leather, Leather and Footwear
20 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork
21t22 Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and Publishing
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products
25 Rubber and Plastics
26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral
27t28 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal
29 Machinery, Nec
30t33 Electrical and Optical Equipment
34t35 Transport equipment
36t37 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling
E Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
F Construction
50 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles, Retail Sale of Fuel
51 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles
52 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles; Repair of Household Goods
H Hotels and Restaurants
60 Inland Transport
61 Water Transport
62 Air Transport
63 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities;
Activities of Travel Agencies
64 Post and Telecommunications
J Financial Intermediation
70 Real Estate Activities
71t74 Renting of M& Eq and Other Business Activities
L Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security
M Education
N Health and Social Work
Table 6: Sector codes in the World Input-Output Database
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Category Industry Description
Agriculture, food and mining AtB, 15t16, C
Machinery 29, 36t37, 34t35
High-skilled manufacturing 24, 30t33
Low-skilled manufacturing 21t22, 23, 25, 17t18, 19, 20, 26, 27t28
Low-skilled services 50, 51, 52, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, H, F
Professional services J, 70, 71t74, L, M, N
Table 7: Industry aggregation
Share on LL Share on LH relative to K
Sector (αj) (δj)
Agriculture, food and mining 0.32 0.19
High-skilled manufacturing 0.32 0.49
Low-skilled manufacturing 0.43 0.33
Low-skilled service 0.51 0.34
Machinery 0.47 0.39
Professional Service 0.27 0.44
Table 8: Factor shares for each sector
Note: The U.S. data in 2001 are used as the baseline.
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PISA score in math (2003) PISA score in reading (2003)
Correlation Coef. Rank Corr. Correlation Coef. Rank Corr.
Calibrated γi 0.74 0.79 0.75 0.80
Table 9: Correlations between calibrated educational institution and PISA scores
Note: The correlation coef. is the Pearson correlation coefficient, and the rank corr. is
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.
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Industry Agriculture, Food High-skilled Low-skilled Low-skilled Machinery Professional
and Mining Manufacturing Manufacturing Service Service
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance (logarithm) -0.737 -0.511 -0.654 -0.79 -0.553 -0.772
(-24.32) (-16.73) (-20.79) (-23.27) (-18.28) (-22.06)
Contiguity 0.786 0.817 1.004 -0.097 0.721 -0.556
(3.68) (3.78) (4.5) (-0.41) (3.34) (-2.14)
Common language 0.778 0.585 0.83 0.924 0.736 1.278
(3.19) (2.44) (3.31) (3.41) (3.03) (4.42)
Common colonizer 0.674* 0.453 0.521 0.513 0.476 -0.186
(2.58) (1.72) (1.91) (1.76) (1.81) (-0.59)
Origin fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1296 1364 1392 1156 1327 1039
R2 0.51 0.5 0.46 0.45 0.53 0.46
Table 10: Gravity model estimates (ordinary least squares)
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Skill Skill Real Wages Relative to real wage of USA
Premium Share Skilled Unskilled Avg
Country wHi /w
L
i L
H
i /L
L
i w
H
i /Pi w
L
i /Pi wi/Pi
AUS 2.26 0.54 133.03 58.84 72.65
AUT 1.75 0.70 229.80 131.46 155.76
BEL 1.59 0.79 359.35 226.00 263.38
BGR 2.30 0.44 27.66 12.03 14.47
BRA 3.22 0.30 22.29 6.92 8.52
CAN 1.53 0.78 244.53 159.95 183.55
CHN 2.27 0.40 6.56 2.89 3.41
CYP 1.89 0.64 220.57 116.74 140.02
CZE 1.97 0.56 69.81 35.36 42.22
DEU 1.71 0.69 174.29 102.21 119.89
DNK 1.34 0.93 195.81 145.72 162.59
ESP 1.77 0.66 114.46 64.80 76.49
EST 1.81 0.61 63.92 35.33 41.57
FIN 1.41 0.86 185.66 131.66 148.40
FRA 1.80 0.68 186.15 103.43 123.21
GBR 1.65 0.77 179.16 108.54 127.66
GRC 2.18 0.52 102.19 46.95 56.95
HUN 2.35 0.50 72.55 30.87 38.02
IDN 3.74 0.25 10.38 2.78 3.42
IND 4.67 0.20 8.99 1.92 2.40
IRL 1.54 0.91 269.57 175.20 204.76
ITA 1.97 0.58 166.41 84.26 101.04
JPN 1.63 0.71 141.71 86.78 100.74
KOR 1.69 0.67 86.26 50.90 59.41
LTU 1.87 0.57 48.72 26.12 30.75
LUX 1.73 0.83 562.73 326.02 392.65
LVA 2.07 0.51 51.36 24.76 29.56
MEX 2.93 0.36 52.56 17.96 22.20
MLT 2.29 0.55 226.66 99.00 123.01
NLD 1.59 0.80 212.55 134.04 156.10
POL 1.86 0.60 67.28 36.15 42.80
PRT 2.96 0.39 141.74 47.82 60.28
ROU 2.15 0.47 25.60 11.89 14.19
RUS 2.35 0.38 17.56 7.49 8.85
SVK 1.74 0.63 57.19 32.95 38.46
SVN 2.27 0.53 153.04 67.49 83.06
SWE 1.34 0.91 159.92 119.69 133.04
TUR 3.38 0.30 39.18 11.58 14.41
TWN 1.86 0.64 123.49 66.43 79.26
USA 1.93 0.64 159.69 82.79 100.00
Average 2.11 0.59 134.26 75.84 89.48
Table 12: The baseline equilibrium in the steady state
Note: All real wages are relative to the U.S. average real wage; hence, the U.S. average real wage is normalized to 100.
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Skill Premium Relative Skill Supply Labor Force Educational Institution
Country (wHi /w
L
i ) (L
H
i /L
L
i ) (millions) (γi)
AUS 2.26 0.17 9.13 0.72
AUT 1.75 0.19 3.96 1.12
BEL 1.59 0.20 4.16 1.37
BGR 2.30 0.08 3.22 0.63
BRA 3.22 0.14 79.54 0.38
CAN 1.53 0.26 15.20 1.43
CHN 2.27 0.04 730.25 0.60
CYP 1.89 0.40 0.32 0.96
CZE 1.97 0.14 4.96 0.85
DEU 1.71 0.31 39.32 1.14
DNK 1.34 0.37 2.74 2.00
ESP 1.77 0.39 16.93 1.06
EST 1.81 0.46 0.58 0.98
FIN 1.41 0.47 2.32 1.73
FRA 1.80 0.35 24.76 1.06
GBR 1.65 0.42 29.92 1.28
GRC 2.18 0.22 4.26 0.73
HUN 2.35 0.19 4.23 0.66
IDN 3.74 0.06 93.44 0.30
IND 4.67 0.06 432.38 0.23
IRL 1.54 0.33 1.75 1.57
ITA 1.97 0.13 23.39 0.86
JPN 1.63 0.31 64.76 1.23
KOR 1.69 0.72 21.56 1.13
LTU 1.87 0.35 1.35 0.91
LUX 1.73 0.26 0.28 1.26
LVA 2.07 0.28 0.95 0.76
MEX 2.93 0.14 40.10 0.45
MLT 2.29 0.11 0.15 0.72
NLD 1.59 0.29 8.28 1.38
POL 1.86 0.16 14.20 0.94
PRT 2.96 0.08 5.12 0.47
ROU 2.15 0.05 10.66 0.70
RUS 2.35 0.14 74.73 0.56
SVK 1.74 0.16 2.04 1.05
SVN 2.27 0.18 0.91 0.71
SWE 1.34 0.33 4.39 1.98
TUR 3.38 0.10 21.52 0.37
TWN 1.86 0.32 9.38 0.98
USA 1.93 0.43 146.82 0.94
Average 2.11 0.25 48.85 0.95
Table 11: Country characteristics calculated using the year 2001 data
Note: See Appendix (??) for the details of the calculation.
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Changes in Skill Premium (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Short-run Medium-run Long-run | (2)−(3)
(2)
| × 100
AUS -0.15 2.09 0.81 61.44
AUT 0.15 1.47 0.50 65.79
BEL 0.25 1.11 0.35 68.24
BGR -0.11 2.85 1.07 62.36
BRA -0.27 3.26 1.32 59.36
CAN 0.14 1.22 0.37 69.50
CHN -0.51 3.03 1.12 63.01
CYP 0.01 1.91 0.69 64.12
CZE -0.10 1.97 0.71 64.02
DEU -0.12 1.34 0.45 66.73
DNK -0.18 1.64 0.45 72.74
ESP -0.14 1.87 0.64 65.66
EST -0.11 2.45 0.84 65.59
FIN 0.44 1.83 0.53 71.07
FRA -0.17 1.38 0.48 65.49
GBR -0.04 1.49 0.49 66.83
GRC -0.11 2.12 0.80 62.37
HUN -0.26 1.86 0.72 61.49
IDN -0.32 3.38 1.40 58.63
IND -0.28 3.16 1.35 57.37
IRL 0.85 1.99 0.64 67.68
ITA -0.21 1.47 0.53 64.11
JPN -0.20 1.28 0.41 67.72
KOR -0.13 1.68 0.56 66.62
LTU -0.07 2.64 0.92 65.21
LUX 0.79 1.57 0.55 65.00
LVA -0.04 2.73 1.00 63.38
MEX -0.62 1.79 0.71 60.06
MLT -0.16 1.57 0.60 61.53
NLD 0.03 1.55 0.50 67.84
POL -0.13 2.11 0.74 65.00
PRT -0.09 1.81 0.74 59.23
ROU -0.36 2.53 0.93 63.02
RUS -0.56 3.28 1.21 63.14
SVK 0.15 2.33 0.79 66.21
SVN -0.02 1.66 0.63 61.89
SWE 0.05 1.62 0.44 72.96
TUR -0.27 2.66 1.09 59.19
TWN -0.27 1.37 0.48 65.17
USA -0.02 1.57 0.57 63.81
Average -0.08 2.02 0.73 64.51
Table 13: Decomposition of changes in the skill premium(%) resulting from an
unanticipated 25% trade cost reduction
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